The Strait of Hormuz has already been the story. Now there’s a second chokepoint.
Iran asked their Houthi allies in Yemen to stand ready to close the Bab el-Mandeb Strait, Reuters reported on Wednesday, citing two senior Iranian sources and one regional source. Houthi forces have already deployed missiles and drones capable of targeting ships in the Red Sea. Crucially, the decision on if and when to execute the strikes will rest with members of Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps physically stationed in Yemen — not with the Houthi leadership itself, and not with Tehran’s political commanders at a distance. The IRGC’s on-the-ground representatives will retain direct final control over the timing of any closure order. A Houthi political bureau member, Mohammed al-Farah, made the threat explicit: “Bab-el-Mandeb will join with Hormuz, and the price of oil will rise to $200.”
The Bab el-Mandeb is not yet closed. That distinction matters. But the infrastructure to close it is in place, the order hasn’t been given yet, and the conflict dynamics that would trigger that order are actively present right now.
What the Bab el-Mandeb Actually Is
Most coverage of this conflict has focused on the Strait of Hormuz, the Persian Gulf chokepoint Iran has been threatening and partially closing since February 2026. The Bab el-Mandeb is different in geography but comparable in consequence.
The strait sits at the southern end of the Red Sea, separating Yemen from Djibouti and Eritrea on the Horn of Africa. At its narrowest point it’s just 26 kilometres wide — less than half the width of the English Channel. Through that narrow passage flows roughly 10 to 12 percent of all global seaborne trade, including a third of European imports from Asia, 13 percent of the world’s automobiles and automotive components, and significant volumes of consumer goods — 40 percent of global vacuum cleaner trade, 25 percent of microwaves, 22 percent of washing machines, according to ORF’s analysis.
For energy specifically, approximately 8.8 million barrels of oil per day transited the Bab el-Mandeb before the current conflict, though that figure fell to around 4 million barrels per day during the Houthi attack campaign against shipping in 2023-2024 during the Gaza war. When the Houthis paused attacks after the Gaza ceasefire in October 2025, traffic partially recovered. Those same capabilities — missiles, drones, sea mines — are still there.
If both straits close simultaneously, the numbers are stark:
- Hormuz carries roughly 20 percent of the world’s seaborne oil and gas
- Bab el-Mandeb carries another 10 to 12 percent of global trade
- Combined, a quarter of the world’s energy supply would be blocked at two points simultaneously
The Trap Inside Saudi Arabia’s Backup Plan
Here’s the part of this story that has received less attention than it deserves, and it’s the most strategically significant detail.
When Iran closed the Strait of Hormuz in February 2026, Saudi Arabia activated its contingency plan. The Kingdom rerouted crude exports westward through the East-West Pipeline to Yanbu, its Red Sea port. At peak utilization in March 2026, the pipeline was running at its full capacity of 7 million barrels per day — more than it had ever carried before. The bypass worked. Saudi exports continued. The world’s largest oil exporter stayed in the market.
That backup plan runs directly through the Bab el-Mandeb.
Every barrel that loads at Yanbu and heads to Asia must transit the strait Yemen controls. Approximately 30 tankers are currently staged near Yanbu within confirmed Houthi strike range. The route that was designed to survive Hormuz’s closure leads directly into the second chokepoint the Houthis are now being asked to lock.
Gibson Shipping Company issued a warning this week that the shipping industry should “prepare for much more difficult oil supply conditions” if the Bab el-Mandeb closes — noting that global oil reserves have already been drawn down sharply during the months of conflict, leaving the market with less buffer than it had at the start of 2026.
What Would Trigger a Closure
Iran’s ask to the Houthis, according to Reuters’ sources, is specifically conditional: the closure would be triggered if the US follows through on President Trump’s threats to strike Iran’s civilian infrastructure. On Tuesday night, in an exclusive Fox News interview with chief foreign correspondent Trey Yingst, Trump gave those threats a specific timeline. “We’re going to hit them very hard tonight. We’re going to hit them very hard tomorrow night. We’re going to hit them very hard the night after,” Trump said. “And then next week, it gets really bad for them, because next week comes the power plants. Next week comes the bridges. We’re going to knock out all their power plants. We’re going to knock out all their bridges unless they get to the table and negotiate.“
That’s not a vague warning — it’s a named timeline. Power plants and bridges, starting next week, unless Iran returns to negotiations. The Houthi threat to close Bab el-Mandeb is Iran and its allies’ stated counter-deterrent to exactly that scenario.
Trump’s infrastructure ultimatum was the most escalatory language he’s used since declaring the ceasefire “over” on July 8. The Houthi threat, then, is structured as a deterrent — a signal to Washington that military action against Iranian civilian targets would trigger a second simultaneous maritime shutdown with consequences well beyond Iran itself.
Whether it functions as a deterrent or an invitation depends on how the White House reads it. Trump has not publicly acknowledged the Bab el-Mandeb threat as of this writing.
The Houthis also struck Saudi Arabia this week — and the trigger for that is the detail most coverage has glossed over. On July 13, Yemen’s internationally recognized government bombed the runway at Sana’a International Airport to prevent a Mahan Air Airbus A340-300 from landing — the aircraft was carrying the Houthi delegation home from Tehran, where they had attended Khamenei’s funeral. The government said it had exhausted diplomatic efforts to persuade the Houthis to use a Yemenia aircraft instead; the Houthis refused and insisted on the Iranian flight. When the runway was struck and the Mahan Air jet diverted to Hodeidah, Houthi military spokesman Yahya Saree accused Saudi Arabia of direct responsibility — despite Riyadh not confirming involvement — and formally declared the four-year de-escalation phase “over,” threatening to strike King Khalid Airport in Riyadh. The Houthis then fired ballistic missiles at Saudi Arabia, shattering the longest period of relative calm between the two sides since the Yemen civil war began. That’s the spark behind the Houthi escalation currently driving the Bab el-Mandeb threat.
- An IRGC adviser, Ali Akbar Velayati, stating publicly that US opposition “views Bab al-Mandeb as it does Hormuz” — framing the two straits as equivalent levers in the same pressure campaign
- Deployed missiles and drones that security analysts confirm are already capable of reaching ships in the Red Sea without additional preparation
The Houthis have done this before. During the 2023-2024 Gaza campaign, they conducted nearly 200 attacks on Red Sea shipping — not enough to fully close the strait, but enough to cause major shipping companies including Maersk, CMA CGM, and Hapag-Lloyd to reroute around the Cape of Good Hope. That rerouting adds 10 to 14 days to Asia-Europe voyages and approximately $1.2 to $1.8 million in additional fuel costs per round trip, according to ORF’s analysis. War-risk insurance premiums have already risen more than 1,000 percent since the conflict began.
Why a Full Closure Would Be Different From 2023-2024
The Houthi attacks during the Gaza war were sustained harassment — damaging, expensive, and disruptive, but not a complete shutdown. Ships were attacked; many got through. A formal Iranian-ordered closure would be a different operational category.
Eurasia Review’s analysis, published July 13, notes that the Houthis have “avoided full closure of Bab el-Mandeb despite capability” throughout the conflict so far, precisely because “sustained closure is too costly, risking direct confrontation with international naval powers and broader escalation.” That assessment was accurate as of three days ago. What’s changed since then is the explicit, sourced Reuters report that Iran has now requested that the Houthis be ready to flip that switch — a deliberate escalation of the signal beyond what was previously on the table.
The ceasefire framework, such as it remains, imposed no obligations on the Houthis. They were not party to the Islamabad Memorandum of Understanding that Pakistan mediated between the US and Iran in June. Trump’s declaration that the accord is “over” removes even the indirect diplomatic pressure that might have kept Houthi actions calibrated.
What Happens to Oil Prices
The Houthi quote of “$200 per barrel” if Bab el-Mandeb closes alongside Hormuz is a political statement, not an analyst forecast. But the directional logic is real.
Brent crude has been falling since the Islamabad MOU took effect in June, declining from its war-era peak near $120 toward $77 as Hormuz traffic partially recovered and the US lifted Iranian oil sanctions on a temporary basis. A simultaneous closure of both straits would immediately reverse that trend. The question isn’t whether oil would spike — it would — but how far and how fast depends on how much buffer remains in global strategic petroleum reserves, which have already been drawn down substantially during the months of conflict.
The alternative route for Asia-bound energy — around the Cape of Good Hope — adds two weeks to voyages and has finite tanker capacity. It was always a bridge, not a solution. If both straits close simultaneously, that bridge becomes the only road, and the traffic it can handle has hard limits.
The Broader Strategic Picture
This threat doesn’t exist in isolation. It’s the latest layer in a conflict that has been escalating in a specific pattern since the US-Iran ceasefire began breaking down: Iranian drone strikes on commercial ships, US retaliatory strikes on Iranian military targets, Trump declaring the accord “over,” US strikes on Iranian army barracks in Bampur killing seven soldiers, Iran filing a complaint with the UN accusing the US of violating the Islamabad MOU.
Now a second front is opening — not in Iran itself, but in Yemen, through a proxy force that operates outside any ceasefire framework and has demonstrated both the capability and the willingness to close international shipping lanes.
The question the shipping industry, energy markets, and global governments are all running the same calculation on right now is straightforward: if the order comes from Tehran, will the Houthis execute it? Their track record suggests the answer is yes. The order hasn’t come yet. Whether it does depends on decisions being made in Washington and Tehran — neither of which has shown much willingness to back down this week.